Abstract: In Ireland as in many other countries there has been an ongoing debate on the nature, degree and trends of regional imbalance. However, relatively little is known about the effects of policies at the regional level in Ireland. This paper considers two aspects of public policy namely the fiscal system and public expenditure. In particular regional government accounts are constructed, which identify the level of taxation, subsidisation and public expenditure at the regional level. The analysis of this data confirms that the fiscal system does reduce relative income differences in Ireland. Furthermore there are substantial resource transfers across regions.
The Regional Dimension of Taxes and Public Expenditure in Ireland Introduction
In Ireland there has been an ongoing debate about regional disparities going back at least to the 1950's with the enactment of the Underdeveloped Areas Act in 1952 1 .
Despite or perhaps in spite of the recent strong growth performance there is a perception of growing regional disparities. This perception is supported by the data on output measures (see O'Leary, 2001 or Boyle, McCarthy and Walsh, 1999 ), but it is not supported by population and labour market trends (see Walsh, 2006) . The debate about the existence and scale of regional disparities has been accompanied by a debate about appropriate regional policies and the appropriate allocation of resources across the regions, which however, has not been matched by rigorous analysis of existing policies. Exceptions to this are a number of papers on the effect of industrial policies and a recent contribution on the effect of a tax incentive scheme. Killen and Ruane (1998) found that company and job survival rates in the foreign owned sector are higher overall than in the indigenous sector, and that survival rates are generally higher for foreign companies at the periphery and for indigenous companies at the cores. An econometric study found that 27 per cent of the job generation in the designated (lagging) areas over the relevant period could be explicitly linked to regional industrial policy (Meyler and Strobl, 2000) . However, according to Barrios, S., H. Gőrg and E. Strobl (2006) the policy to disperse industry across all regions, that was pursued in the 1970s was only effective in attracting lowtech firms to the disadvantaged areas. Furthermore, urbanisation economies were a more important locational determinant for high-tech firms than public invectives.
In order to increase economic activity and promote growth in the Upper Shannon
Region the Irish government introduced a Rural Renewal Tax Scheme that consisted of special tax breaks in respect to construction developments. Keane and Garvey (2006) showed that while this scheme reduced unemployment, the costs associated with it were too high for the scheme to pass efficiency tests.
Recently the issue of expenditure across regions has become the focus of debate.
For example the Dublin Chamber of Commerce called for more investment in the Dublin region arguing that, "as a driver of economic growth, innovation and employment for the whole island, the needs of the Greater Dublin Area must be prioritised" (Dublin Chamber of Commerce, 2007) . On the other hand residents of the less developed regions feel that they are not receiving enough attention particularly in relation to public investment. For example Senator Margaret Cox resigned from the largest government party (Fianna Fail) in early April 2007 because "failure of this Government to spend all the money we promised to invest, and to deliver the projects we committed to, is adversely impacting the daily life of people living in the West" 2 .
This latter view is at least partially driven by the experience with the last National Development Plan (NDP) [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , for which however data was only available for the two NUTS 2 regions. Fitz Gerald, McCarthy, Morgenroth and O'Connell (2003) showed in their Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] NDP, that for all spending areas the Southern and Eastern Region was to receive a substantially larger allocation of resources than the Border, Midlands and Western (BMW) region, which of course reflects the different relative size of the regions in terms of population. In per capita terms, however, expenditure in the BMW region was planned to exceed that of the Southern and Eastern region, although the relative allocations within
Operational Programmes vary in some cases. When it came to the actual progress the MTE showed that these differences were magnified in the outturn with expenditure significantly lower in the BMW region.
While this debate has been ongoing, little is known about the extent and effect of the fiscal system and government expenditure on regional disparities. Thus, the disparities might well be worse if current policies were not in place.
As Bradley and Morgenroth (1999) note, the fact that the regional disparities in income are smaller than those in output may be due to the redistributive effect of the fiscal system. However, they did not carry out any analysis to back up this assertion.
Since regional government accounts are not available for Ireland, which contrasts with the situation in many other countries, such an analysis is not straightforward.
Internationally, fiscal transfers and the distribution of government expenditure at the regional level have been a subject to substantial analysis and debate. For example in the case of the UK the Barnett formula, which is used to distribute resources across regions has been subject to substantial criticism (see McLean and McMillan, 2003) .
MacKay (2001) Rodriguez, 2006) and Portugal (Nogueira Ramos, 2000) . Gordon et al. (2004) showed that London makes a substantial net contribution the UK exchequer, implying that revenue collected in London is redistributed to other regions in the UK.
Despite the ongoing debate a robust analysis of these issues has not been possible in Ireland due to the lack of data. It is the purpose of this paper to construct a consistent dataset and analyse this with a view to identifying the level of cross regional transfers. As such it directly addresses some of the topics of the recent debate.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief outline of the fiscal relations across counties, regions and central government. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of taxes and transfer on average income in each county. As this only covers a small part of the fiscal system, regional government accounts are constructed using existing data in conjunction with a number of strong assumptions.
This data is then used to identify cross regional transfers.
A Brief Guide to the Irish Regions
There are eight NUTS 3 region, and these make up two NUTS 2 regions, namely the Border, Midlands and West region and the Southern and Eastern region. Table 1 illustrates some of the key characteristics in terms of size and economic development for the most recent years for which data is available. Firstly the table shows that the regions differ quite significantly in terms of size their populations and territory. While
Dublin contains a population, which is almost five times the size of the population of the Midlands region it covers the smallest territory.
The Furthermore the implied dependency rates of between 1 and 1.28 dependents per worker are also small with a relatively small gap. 
The Structure of Fiscal Transfers in Ireland
Before we turn to the effect of the fiscal system on regional income differences and the degree of redistribution across regions it is useful to review the nature of local, regional and national government expenditure at the regional level 3 .
As highlighted in Morgenroth (1999) Ireland has a very centralised government structure. Regional governance is very weak even though two layers of regional government exist, namely the Regional Assemblies (NUTS 2) and the Regional Authorities (NUTS 3). The regional Assemblies are however the managing authorities for the regional operational programmes of the National Development Plan (NDP) which includes the EU structural funds. Apart from this they along with the Regional Authorities are responsible for the production of regional development plans and the promotion of co-ordination among the local authorities and town councils. These have a number of functions social housing, water supply, sewerage, refuse, pollution, recreation, fire protection, roads (other than national) and planning. These roles involve the supply of local public goods such as fire protection, the supply of congestable public goods such as roads and the supply club goods such as recreation.
This centralised structure also implies that expenditure is highly centralised. Thus the regional assemblies (NUTS2) and regional authorities (NUTS3) have no taxraising powers, while local authorities have very limited tax-raising powers. There is no system of regional equalisation payments. Instead the Central Government gives grants to the local authorities. General taxes and subsidies (with the exception of commercial rates and user charges) are uniform throughout the State and thus these are not aimed to directly influence regional development.
The local authorities can raise revenue through commercial property rates. 
The impact of taxes and transfers on incomes
As mentioned above Bradley and Morgenroth (1999) pointed to the fact that the functioning of the welfare and tax system through their redistributive functions might be responsible for reducing the gap in incomes as compared to the gap between output measures across regions. While this requires a substantial amount of analysis, it turns out that it is relatively straightforward to identify the impact of transfers and taxes on incomes. This comparison is facilitated by the detailed breakdown of sources of income and taxes available in the published data available from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) as part of the County Incomes and Regional GDP statistical releases.
This data is available at the county level, which identifies incomes in 27 counties. In addition to the comparison of the level of gap between the counties with the lowest and highest incomes it is also interesting to consider the differences in each income measure for individual counties. Source: Own calculations using CSO County Incomes and Regional GDP various issues.
Construction of Regional Government Accounts
Of course personal taxes on personal income and personal subsidies are not the only fiscal transfers that take place, since government also provides services and invests in the regions. Consequently it is also useful to consider how wider government expenditure and taxes are distributed across regions. This analysis can however not readily be carried out since data on such flows is not published in a readily usable form, rather the data needs to be assembled into one comparable source. In particular some published data does not correspond to national accounts totals. For example total tax revenue for the state (local and central government) was €44.3 billion in 2004 while the figures from the regional accounts and county incomes add to only €37.6 billion, a difference of €6.7 billion. Furthermore, the Regional Accounts do not contain information on all major government activities such as public investment and expenditure on health and education. We therefore aim to produce a consistent set of regional government accounts that correspond to the national accounts total for the whole economy.
Given that only certain data series are available at the regional level it is not possible to construct accounts that are as comprehensive as those available at the national level. However, using the data in conjunction with some strong assumptions it is possible to produce regional government accounts that contain the main components. For this purpose it is useful to first split the government accounts into a revenue (largely taxation) and expenditure side.
Within revenue and expenditure we can identify a number of subheadings for which we aim to construct data. For revenue these are taxes, transfers from abroad and other revenues. Taxes are further subdivided into household taxes, product taxes and other taxes. Since these do not add to the total taxes identified a further category of remaining taxes, which is constructed by apportioning the unaccounted remainder of taxes according to the regional shares of recorded taxes. Other revenues, which include investment income, rental income, loan repayments and borrowing and transfers from abroad, are distributed across the regions according to population
shares. In total these latter categories of revenue account for about 14% of total revenues and clearly using population shares to attribute these revenues results in more even revenue generation across regions. However, it appears reasonable for example to attribute the investment income and loan repayments (18% of other revenues), which derives from investment in public corporations and investments by the Central Bank of Ireland on a per capita basis. Likewise borrowing (16% of other revenues) is naturally distributed across the population. Thus, while this might introduce a bias into the analysis it is likely that the bias is negligible.
These calculations yield the following table for 2004 (Table 2) where the first three rows are taken directly from the County Incomes and Regional GDP statistical release and the remaining data at the county level being constructed as outlined. In the table the row totals for total tax revenue, transfers from abroad and other revenues match the corresponding entries in the National Income and Expenditure (NIE) accounts. As with taxes, some published data of transfers at the regional level are available from the County Incomes and Regional GDP, but again they do not add to the total in the NIE tables. In some years this case the total slightly exceeds that from the NIE so instead of adding a small amount is subtracted to align the data with NIE. As before the differences are attributed on the basis of the regional shares of recorded subsidies.
The wage bill, which forms part of expenditure on goods and services, is calculated using the employment numbers from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and the average wage (obtained from the ESRI Macroeconomic database 4 ). For this calculation the data is disaggregated into health and education and public administration and defence. The wage bill does not cover other current expenditure, which is covered in NIE (e.g. stationery etc.). This is allocated according to the shares of public workers in the regions. Thus the total expenditure on goods and services is derived. Clearly this approach assumes that the mix of grades within the public service is equal across regions and it assumes that there is only limited commuting across regions, neither of which may hold in practice. However, alternative approaches are not readily available. At least in relation to commuting it is possible to consider the likely impact, and once one amalgamates the Dublin and MidEast regions between which substantial commuting flows take place, a relatively modest level of commuting across regions is observed. Based on calculation using the 2002 Census of Population Commuting Micro-data, other than the Mid-East for which net commuting outflows account for about 32% of workers and Dublin where the net inflow is about 16% only the Midlands region which has a net outflow of about 10% no other region records substantial cross regional commuting.
This leaves just two items, namely other expenditure, which includes loan repayment and redemption of securities etc. and Gross Physical Capital Formation.
Other expenditure is simply allocated to the regions according to population shares, while it is possible to apportion the GPCF more precisely using the data from the Construction Industry Review and Outlook 5 . This is used to derive the shares for each type of investment, which goes to each region and using this, the total GFCF is derived. In many cases the total investments in the NIE are very similar to those in the Construction Industry Review and Outlook so the resulting regional totals should be quite robust. 
Analysis
Having constructed regional accounts in the manner outlined above it is possible to analyse trends in the various indicators 6 . Firstly we consider the trends in real per capita resource transfers, that is the per capita excess of expenditure over revenue, which is shown in Figure 4 . The figure clearly shows that the level of redistribution has increased over time, which implies that the gap between resource inflows and outflows has increased. This suggests that the Irish fiscal system despite not having explicit equalisation rules acts to reduce regional disparities. This is supported by correlation coefficients for the correlation between the implied transfer of resources and real per capita gross value added (GVA) which are negative and range from 0.86 (1996) to 0.99 (2003) and are all statistically significant (see Table 4 ). Not surprisingly, the table also shows that revenue is highly correlated to GVA. However, while expenditure is also positively correlated with GVA this correlation is smaller than that for revenue, declining over time and not statistically significant for more recent years. Overall these results correspond to those found by Gordon et.al (2004) in that the capital city makes a net contribution to the exchequer, which is redistributed to other regions. Furthermore, the results suggest that the fiscal system does ameliorate regional disparities, which corresponds with that of MacKay (2003) Given that the debate has been concentrating on expenditures and particularly investment it is particularly interesting to consider trends in real per capita public investment. As figure 5 clearly shows that in real terms the level of investment has increased substantially in all regions. However, the Dublin region received a disproportionate share of investment with the level of disproportionality increasing over time. It should however, be noted that given the population of Dublin, in per capita terms Dublin is not favoured when it comes to capital expenditure. Indeed no clear pattern of 'excess' per capita capital expenditure can be detected in the data. It is possible to assess this rationale in terms of the impact on government spending using the assumptions outlined above. These calculations show that 'decentralisation' increases public expenditure in all regions except Dublin, with these increases ranging from 1.2% in the West to 3.9% in the Midlands Regions, while
Dublin would have experienced a decline in public expenditure of 4.9% 11 .
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to identify the impact of 'decentralisation' on regional taxation as it is difficult to assess the degree of leakage of income out of the regions (e.g. through shopping in another region, cross regional commuting etc.) so it is not possible to identify the impact of decentralisation on overall public expenditure balances. However, as revenue collected directly from the civil and public servants will be a fraction of their total income (wage bill) the overall impact is likely to further reduce imbalances. Of course the proposed decentralisation scheme was to be implemented over a number of years and indeed the pace of implementation has been slow so that the overall impact of the scheme to date has been very limited 12 .
Conclusions
This paper attempts to bring some factual basis to the ongoing debate on regional government expenditure. As such it first considers the degree to which taxes and subsidies at the household level reduce the relative differences in average incomes across counties. That analysis confirms that the fiscal system does reduce relative income differences in Ireland. Since household taxes and subsidies are only a small component of the fiscal system and since the bulk of central and local government revenue is collected at the central level the paper also attempts an analysis of a wider set of regional government accounts, which given that such accounts are not readily available, are constructed in a consistent basis. This requires some strong assumptions, and clearly the estimates derived are dependent on the validity of these assumptions.
The data show some interesting results. Dublin and the South-West contribute to a substantial resource transfer to other regions. The level of transfers is found to be highly related to the state of development. In other words the fiscal system works in a progressive manner in relation to regional disparities 13 . Nevertheless the better off regions receive an above average level of expenditure so that the system only partially equalises. This is particularly pronounced in relation to public gross fixed capital formation, where Dublin gets a significantly larger share in per capita terms than other regions. The result that the tax and expenditure system is progressive across regions stands in contrast with the finding that in Ireland this system has only moderate redistributive qualities across individuals (see Nolan and Smeeding, 2005) .
The debate about regional expenditure is implicitly a debate about the trade off between equity and efficiency. Thus poorer regions would argue that that they deserve a 'fair share' of the nation's wealth, while richer regions would argue that this wealth could only be created if there is sufficient investment in their regions. In as much as the analysis presented here can address this debate, the results would suggest that the Irish fiscal system does provide a mechanism to achieve more equity, while at the same time preserving a higher level of expenditure in the wealth generating regions.
The finding that the system provides a significant degree of regional equity is largely the result of the centralised nature of revenue collection in conjunction with the aim to provide similar levels of service across the full range of government activities in all regions. In order to achieve a similar level of equity with a less centralised system would require a more sophisticated system of fiscal equalisation payments across regions. Thus, while many have argued that the Irish system is too centralised (see Morgenroth, 2000) this centrality turns out to be an asset in terms of achieving regional equity.
The conclusion that the system is indeed equitable is based on per capita levels of revenue and expenditure rather than an assessment of needs. However, while this issue was raised in the early 1990s (e.g. Ridge, 1992 and Ridge and Smith, 1992) Whether the levels of transfers provide an optimal balance between equity and efficiency cannot be determined with the analysis provided here. However, at least some researchers have commented on an excessive bias towards equity. For example O'Leary (2002) argued that regional equity considerations might undermine efforts to increase productivity growth, which will be the main driver of future prosperity. In this respect it is noteworthy that public investment accounts for a relatively small percentage of public expenditure and as there is no clear pattern of 'excess' capital expenditure in the less developed regions, it appears that the bulk of the redistribution does not tackle any structural deficiencies in those less developed regions.
Given the experience in other less developed regions of Europe such as the Italian Mezzogiorno, which despite being the destination of substantial transfers have not converged, the analysis provided here points in favour of the arguments put forward
by O'Leary (2002) .
An important point to note is that the analysis could not account for regional price differences, which might well reduce real disparities since the price level in more urbanised regions tends to exceed that of poorer more rural regions. Thus the level of subsidisation may actually be understated. Furthermore, this paper has only considered levels of expenditure and revenues, which may mask differences in the cost of providing public services. For example, the costs of providing utilities such as electricity and telecommunications, which are provided to broadly the same standards throughout the country, is higher in rural areas. Thus, since some services are cheaper to provide in more densely populated areas and may be subject to scale effects the richer more urban areas may require a lower expenditure to provide an equal service.
On the other hand more urbanised regions may face higher costs for example in the provision of public housing. Consequently the degree to which differential costs of providing public services across regions affects cross regional redistribution would need to be assessed through further research. over 20 new locations with over 1,000 staff in place. 13. Given the lack of detailed data it is not possible to consider whether the contrasting result compared to the UK is due to discretionary or non-discretionary spending. 
